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This paper analyzes the dynamics of wages and worker mobility within ﬁrms with hierarchical
structures of job levels. The paper empirically implements the theoretical model proposed by
Gibbons and Waldman (1999) that combines the notions of human capital accumulation, job
rank assignment based on comparative advantage and learning about workers’ ability. The
paper measures the importance of these elements in explaining intra-ﬁrm wage and mobility
dynamics using survey data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). The use of
this data set makes it possible to examine this issue over a large sample of ﬁrms and draw
conclusions about the common features characterizing ﬁrms’ wage policy. The GSOEP survey
also provides information about workers’ job ranks within the ﬁrm that is unavailable in most
surveys.
The results of the estimation are consistent with non-random selection of workers onto
the rungs of the ﬁrm’s job ladder. There is no direct evidence of learning about workers’
unobserved ability but the analysis reveals that unmeasured ability is an important factor
driving wage dynamics. Job rank eﬀects remain signiﬁcant even after controlling for measured
and unmeasured characteristics.
Key words: Wage dynamics, intra-ﬁrm mobility, human capital accumulation, unob-
served heterogeneity, learning1 Introduction
The question of how wages are determined is central to the study of labor economics. To date,
the empirical literature on this topic has focused on factors such as the return to interﬁrm mo-
bility on the part of workers (Bartel and Borjas (1981), Neal (1999), Topel and Ward (1992)),
the covariance structure of earnings across workers and ﬁrms (Topel and Ward (1992), Par-
ent(1995)), and inter-industry and ﬁrm-size wage diﬀerentials (Krueger and Summers (1988),
Gibbons and Katz (1992), Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999)). Thus far, little empiri-
cal work has been done on questions relating to the assignment of workers to jobs and the
resulting eﬀects on the evolution of intra-ﬁrm wage structures and mobility within the ﬁrm.
Previous studies on the relationship between wages and careers in organizations present results
speciﬁc to one or a few ﬁrms which, while suggestive, can not easily be generalized to ﬁrms
beyond the type analyzed (Doeringer and Piore (1971), Chiappori, Salani´ e and Valentin(1999),
Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994 a,b)). Empirical studies on the structure of wages and
mobility within ﬁrms using large data sets have not related the analysis to a formal theoretical
framework (McCue (1996)).
This paper presents an empirical study of the common features characterizing wage and
mobility dynamics within ﬁrms. The analysis is based on the theoretical framework of Gibbons
and Waldman (1999) in which the determination of wages depends on how workers’ ability are
evaluated within a job rank, given a hierarchical structure of job levels within ﬁrms where each
job rank has diﬀerent skill requirements. The model speciﬁes a wage equation integrating the
elements of human capital accumulation, job assignment based on comparative advantage and
learning about unobserved worker ability to explain the dynamics of wages and promotions
inside ﬁrms. The objective of this paper is to implement empirically the Gibbons and Wald-
man model and perform the estimation over a large sample of ﬁrms in order to test whether
comparative advantage and learning are important determinants of the wage policies of ﬁrms.
In addition, estimating the model on the sample of workers remaining with their ﬁrm and com-
paring the results to those obtained from the sample that includes ﬁrm changers allows one to
distinguish between ﬁrm speciﬁc eﬀects and individual speciﬁc eﬀects transferable across ﬁrms
in the analysis of the wage dynamics.
The estimation is performed using GMM techniques applied to the longitudinal data from
the German GSOEP over the period 1986-1996. This survey is uniquely appropriate for the
analysis of intra-ﬁrm mobility and wage dynamics because it provides information on hier-
archical job levels within occupations through a question asking speciﬁcally about the rank
1occupied by the worker within his/her current occupation. To my knowledge, this information
is not available in other surveys. 1 The survey also makes it possible to identify movements
both within and across ﬁrms through a question about changes in a worker’s employment sit-
uation in the previous year. These two pieces of information are central to the study of wage
and mobility dynamics within the ﬁrm. Another advantage of the data is that information is
collected over a large sample of individuals and therefore, the analysis of wage dynamics and
intra-ﬁrm mobility can be done over a large sample of ﬁrms.
The German case is an interesting application of the model because the German labor
market is thought to diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the U.S labor market (which provides many of
the observations which motivate Gibbons and Waldman’s research). Particularly, as shown in
Simonet (1998), interﬁrm job mobility declines much earlier in a worker’s career in Germany
than in the U.S. This suggests the possibility that intra-ﬁrm mobility may be more important
in Germany than in the United States. In addition, because of the strength of trade unions
and their close relationship with employer’s associations, German ﬁrms have to deal with
bureaucratic rules governing the setting of wages and job assignments, which could aﬀect the
returns to intra-ﬁrm mobility on the part of German workers. On the other hand, Bruderl,
Diekmann and Preisendorfer (1991) show evidence that early promotions increase the chances
of future promotions using panel data on the personnel records of blue-collared workers in
a large West German company. Their analysis controls for individual and ﬁrm measurable
characteristics but not for unobserved individual heterogeneity suggesting that it might play
a role in the early promotion hypothesis tested. Therefore it is not clear, a priori, whether the
factors of individual ability, comparative advantage and learning, which seem to explain the
U.S experience, are more or less important in Germany.
A number of stylized facts have emerged from the empirical literature on internal wage poli-
cies and mobility within U.S. ﬁrms over the last twenty years. Borrowing from Gibbons (1997),
who provides a detailed review of the literature on careers in organizations, the main ﬁndings
are reported below. First, the main ﬁnding on intra-ﬁrm mobility concerns serial correlation
in promotion rates. Holding tenure in the current job constant, promotion rates decrease with
tenure in the previous job. 2 A related ﬁnding is that demotions are rare (although this ﬁnding
1In particular, the PSID and NLSY occupational codes do not provide a natural ranking of job levels
comparable across occupations.
2Rosenbaum (1984), Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994 a,b), Podolny and Baron (1997) and Chiappori and
al. (1996).
2is based on a study of only one ﬁrm). 3 Second, nominal wage cuts are rare but real wage
cuts are much more common. Partly this is because nominal wage increases are insensitive to
inﬂation and zero nominal increases are not rare. 4 Third, the dynamics of wages within the
ﬁrm exhibit serial correlation in the sense that a real wage increase (decrease) today is serially
correlated with a real wage increase (decrease) tomorrow. 5 Fourth, studies that analyze the
relationship between wages and intra-ﬁrm mobility ﬁnd that wage increases received by work-
ers who are promoted exceed increases reported by workers who do not receive promotions. 6
However, wage increases upon promotion are small compared to the diﬀerence in average wages
between two job levels. In other words, signiﬁcant variations in wages remain within each level
so that wages are not tied to levels. Finally, wage increases forecast promotions in the sense
that those who receive larger wage increases get promoted more rapidly. 7
Collectively, these observations posed a challenge to the existing theoretical literature, as
no pre-existing theory could explain all of these stylized facts. In response to this challenge,
Gibbons and Waldman (1999) build a synthesized model which combines on the job human
capital accumulation, job assignment based on comparative advantage and learning dynamics.
The predictions of their model are consistent with most of the stylized facts found in the
empirical literature. The main contribution of this paper is to examine the explanatory power
of the Gibbons and Waldman theory over a large sample of ﬁrms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sketches the theoretical model of Gibbons
and Waldman and establishes the framework of the econometric analysis and how this relates
to the theory. Section 3 presents the data and provides a descriptive analysis of intra-ﬁrm
mobility and wage outcomes in German ﬁrms. Section 4 presents the results of the estimation,
and Section 5 concludes the paper.
3Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994 a,b).
4Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom(1994 a,b) report this in the case of one ﬁrm, and Card and Hyslop (1997)
arrive at the same conclusions using the CPS and PSID. Peltzman (2000) reports a similar ﬁnding using BLS
data.
5Hause (1980), Lillard and Weiss (1979) and Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994 a,b).
6Murphy (1985) Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994 a,b) and McCue (1996).
7Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994 a,b). McCue (1996) ﬁnds that a high wage today is positively correlated
with promotion tomorrow, and Topel and Ward (1992) ﬁnd that prior wage growth aﬀects mobility even after
controlling for current wage.
32 Model and Econometric Framework
This section summarizes the Gibbons and Waldman model of intra-ﬁrm mobility and wage
determination and highlights the model’s main predictions. The model characterizes the re-
lationship between a worker’s career path and the evolution of his wage within a ﬁrm. It
integrates wage determination and job assignment in a dynamic context, where the wage pol-
icy of the ﬁrm is based on comparative advantage and learning. In other words, it endogenizes
the allocation of workers to job rank as workers are assigned to job ranks that better reward
their productive ability. In addition, it endogenizes mobility between job ranks because, if the
productive ability of a worker is not perfectly observed, both the ﬁrm and the worker learn
about it and changes in expected productive ability lead the worker to move to another rank
of the job ladder.
Firms are modelled as consisting of various potential job assignments and, because jobs are
diﬀerently sensitive to ability, comparative advantage determines the assignment rule on the
basis of output maximization. Output grows with the workers’ accumulation of human capital
or productive ability each period. In addition, output grows at a diﬀerent speed depending on
the level of innate ability of the worker. All the workers end up reaching the upper level of the
job ladder but some get there faster than others. When innate ability is not perfectly observed,
learning takes place and wages and mobility within the ﬁrm are driven by the evolution of
expected ability.
2.1 Summary of the Model
The model consists of identical ﬁrms operating in a competitive environment and producing
output using labor as the only input. All ﬁrms consist of a three-level job ladder where jobs
are indexed by j = 1,2 or 3. Jobs are deﬁned in advance, independent of the people who ﬁll
them. Both ﬁrms and workers are risk-neutral and have a discount rate of zero.
A worker’s career lasts for T periods. Worker i has innate ability, denoted by θi, which can
be either high (θH) or low (θL). The worker has also eﬀective ability, ηit, deﬁned as the prod-
uct of his innate ability and some function f of his labor-market experience xit prior to period t:
ηit = θif(xit) with f0 > 0 and f00 ≤ 0 (1)
The production technology is such that if worker i is assigned to job j in period t then he
4produces output yijt given by:
yijt = dj + cj(ηit + εijt) (2)
where dj is the output produced by a worker in job j that is independent of the worker’s
characteristics, cj measures the sensitivity of job j to eﬀective ability and εijt is a random
variable drawn independently from a normal distribution with mean zero and variance σ2.
The constants cj and dj are known to all labor-market participants and it is assumed that
c3 > c2 > c1 and d3 < d2 < d1.
Wages are determined by spot-market contracting. At the beginning of each period, all
ﬁrms simultaneously oﬀer each worker a wage for that period and each worker chooses the ﬁrm
that oﬀers the highest wage. Competition among ﬁrms yields wages equal to expected output.
wijt = Eyijt = dj + cjηit = dj + cjθif(xit) (3)
Eﬃcient task assignment is obtained in the sense that a worker is assigned to the job that
maximizes his expected output.
In the case of perfect information, θi, is common knowledge at the beginning of the worker’s
career and therefore ηit is always known. In this case, job assignments and wages in equilibrium
are given according to the following rule:
1. If ηit < η0 then worker i is assigned to job 1 in period t and earns wit = d1 + c1ηit.
2. If η0 < ηit < η00 then worker i is assigned to job 2 in period t and earns wit = d2 + c2ηit.
3. If ηit > η00 then worker i is assigned to job 3 in period t and earns wit = d3 + c3ηit.
The critical values, η0 and η00, are those levels of eﬀective ability at which a worker is equally
productive at jobs 1 and 2 and 2 and 3 respectively. In equilibrium, workers climb the successive
rungs of the job ladder as they gain experience.
The model under perfect information can explain most of the stylized facts of the empirical
literature. The model exhibits an absence of demotions, serial correlation in wage increases
and promotions, and the fact that wage increases predict promotions while explaining only a
fraction of the diﬀerence in average wages across levels.
There are no demotions in equilibrium because eﬀective ability increases monotonically.
Serial correlation in wage increases occurs because eﬀective ability grows diﬀerently for each
worker due to their diﬀering levels of innate ability. That is, for a given level of experience, high
5ability workers will get higher wage increases than low ability workers and the same ordering
will hold for wage increases at all experience levels. The model generates serial correlation in
promotions for the same reasons. If η0 and (η00−η0) are both suﬃciently large then high ability
workers are promoted to job 2 more quickly and also spend less time on job 2 before being
promoted to job 3. Moreover, since those who receive larger wage increases are also those who
are promoted to job 2 earlier in their careers, wage increases predict promotions.
The model gives predictions consistent with the fact that wage increases predict promotion.
A large wage increase indicates an increase in expected innate ability which means that on
average eﬀective ability will grow more quickly in the future so that the worker will need less
time to reach the target level of expected eﬀective ability needed for promotion.
Finally, wage increases upon promotion explain a fraction of the diﬀerence between average
wages across levels because, on average, some of the workers at higher job levels are more
experienced. The diﬀerence between average wages at diﬀerent levels is given by the average
experience or eﬀective ability accumulated. This diﬀerence is bigger than the average wage
increase at promotion which captures the value of only one year of experience.
The model with perfect information predicts that average wage increases at promotion are
higher than average wage increases that would occur if workers remains in their current job
levels. This is because increases in eﬀective ability for those who get promoted are valued
in part at the rate of the current job level (cj) and in part at the higher rate of the next
job level (cj). For the same reason, however, the model predicts that average wage increases
after promotion are higher than the average increases at promotion as increases in eﬀective
ability are entirely valued at the higher job level. This conﬂicts with the empirical ﬁndings
which shows that wage increases at promotion are higher than wage increases before and after
promotion. Moreover, the monotonicity of the eﬀective ability accumulation function precludes
the possibility of real wage decreases.
When information on innate ability is imperfect (but symmetric in that workers and ﬁrms
have the same information about ability), workers and ﬁrms start with the initial belief p0 that
a given worker is of innate ability θH and with 1 − p0 that he is θL. Learning takes place at
the end of each period when the realization of a worker’s output for that period is revealed.
Learning occurs gradually because of the productivity shock εijt, which introduces noise into
the output produced.
To be precise, each period a worker’s output provides a noisy signal, zit, about his eﬀective
ability where:
6zit = (yijt − dj)/cj = ηit + εijt
Note that zit is independent of job assignment so that learning takes place identically across
jobs. Expectations of the innate ability of worker i with x years of prior labor-market expe-
rience at period t will therefore be conditioned on the history of signals extracted from the
observed outputs. Formally, this expectation is deﬁned as:
θe
it = E(θi|zit−x,...,zit−1)
Because output is a linear function of eﬀective ability, expected output at the beginning
of period t, and therefore wages, will be based on expected eﬀective ability (conditional on
the information available at t − 1). Task assignment in each period is then based on the
maximization of current expected output.
In addition to the stylized facts previously discussed in the perfect information model, the
addition of imperfect information and learning allows the model to explain the possibility of
real wage decreases. The argument is based on the fact that wages depend on expected innate
ability, the evolution of which is now driven by the evolution of agents’ beliefs. Because agents
have rational expectations, expected innate ability follows a martingale process:
θe
it = θe
it−1 + uit (4)
This means that the best prediction of future expected innate ability is current expected
innate ability. In other words, any change in current beliefs is caused by the arrival of new
information contained in the observation of current output and could not be predicted from
previous realized outputs.
In the model with imperfect information a worker’s expected innate ability can fall from
one period to the next if uit is negative. If the decrease is suﬃciently large, it will dominate
the increase in eﬀective ability due to human capital accumulation and next period wage will
fall. For the same reason, there will be a positive frequency of demotions.
Average wage increases at promotion are larger than average wage increases before and after
promotion. The worker promoted at the end of the period had a larger increase in expected
eﬀective ability than the worker not promoted. The wage increase will then be higher for
this reason and also because the increase in expected ability will be valued at a bigger rate
(cj+1 > cj). After the promotion, the expected change in expected innate ability is zero so the
wage increase is smaller on average than the wage increase at promotion.
7In summary, as a result of comparative advantage in the assignment of workers to job levels,
the model can explain that wage increases predict promotions while explaining only a fraction
of the diﬀerence in average wages across job levels. Individual heterogeneity in human capital
accumulation or the growth in eﬀective ability the model also explains the observed serial
correlation in wage increases and promotion rates. The introduction of learning allows for the
possibility of real wage decreases and that average wage increases are higher upon promotion
than before and after promotion. With some restrictions on the parameters of the model, η0
and (η00 −η0) are such that the model also predicts an absence of demotions. Thus, the model
can explain the stylized facts highlighted in the literature on wages and intra-ﬁrm mobility.
2.2 Econometric Speciﬁcation
The model of Gibbons and Waldman emphasizes the importance of endogenous choice of job
levels or self-selection of workers into the rungs of the ﬁrm’s job ladder as well as endogenous
mobility across job levels both driven by the evolution of an unmeasured ability term. The
purpose of this Section is to present an econometric speciﬁcation of the wage dynamics implied
by the model of Gibbons and Waldman where these endogeneity problems can be accounted
for and the relative importance of the eﬀects of comparative advantage and learning on the
dynamics of wages can be estimated.
In the general case of comparative advantage and learning the process for wages given in
equation (3) can be written using the expectation of workers’ ability, θe
it.
wijt = dj + cjθe
itf(xit) (5)
Employing dummies, Dijt, indicating the rank j of individual i at time t, the equation to











itf(xit) + µit (6)
where µit is a measurement error independent of rank assignment, and Xit corresponds to
individual characteristics to control for the measurable part of human capital. Comparative
advantage is characterized by the fact that the coeﬃcients βj and cj vary by rank and learning
is represented by the conditional expectation θe
it. In the model with perfect information about
innate ability, θe
it is a time invariant term θi, unmeasurable by the econometrician.
8Estimating equation (6) with OLS would give inconsistent estimates. In both the perfect
and imperfect information case, the comparative advantage hypothesis implies that rank as-
signment is endogenous, so θe
it is correlated with the rank dummies. In addition, this term
cannot be eliminated by ﬁrst-diﬀerencing (6) because it is interacted with the Dijt terms.
Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988) analyze models in which a ﬁxed eﬀect is interacted
with year dummies and show that consistent estimates can be obtained by quasi-diﬀerencing
the equation of interest and using appropriate instrumental-variable techniques. This method
will be applied here to estimate the wage equation (6). 8
2.3 Estimation and Interpretation of the Model Speciﬁcation
This section describes the quasi-diﬀerence technique, the estimation method and the choice
of instruments in the perfect information case with comparative advantage and the imperfect
information case with both comparative advantage and learning. The estimation of the wage
equation also requires to specify a functional form for the human capital accumulation function
f which will be presented in the last part of this section.
The ﬁrst step in estimating (6) is to eliminate θe












The martingale property of beliefs in innate ability which states that θe
it = θe
it−1 + uit, implies














8This technique has been used previously by Lemieux (1998) in the case where the return to a time-invariant
unobserved characteristic is diﬀerent in the union and non-union sector. Gibbons, Katz and Lemieux (1997)
formalize the estimation method in the presence of comparative advantage and learning with an application
to the estimation of the wage diﬀerentials by industry. Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux and Parent (2002) enrich the
preceding results by applying the method to the case of inter-occupation wage diﬀerentials.
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This equation cannot be estimated using non-linear least square because wijt−1 is correlated
with µit−1. Moreover, because of the presence of learning, the new information on innate
ability at time t, uit, is correlated with Dijt since beliefs on ability inﬂuence the current rank
assignment. These problems can be solved by choosing appropriate instruments for wijt−1 and
Dijt, in which case consistent estimates will be obtained. The set of instruments, Zi, has to
satisfy the following condition:
E(eitZi) = 0 (10)
The objective is then to minimize the following quadratic form:
min
γ e(γ)0Z(Z0ΩZ)−1Z0e(γ) (11)
where Z0ΩZ is the covariance matrix of the vector of moments Z0e(γ), Ω is the covariance
matrix of the error term eit and γ is the vector of parameters. An eﬃcient estimator can be
obtained by estimating equation (6) in a ﬁrst step with Ω = I.
Finally, the unmeasured ability term θe
it in the error term of equation (6) is normalized to
zero for the parameters to be identiﬁed. 10 This is done by adding the following equation as a






θit = 0 (12)
where N is the number of individuals, T is the number of periods for each individual and θit
satisﬁes equation (7).
Instruments are chosen using the identiﬁcation assumption for estimation of panel data
equations that imposes strict exogeneity of right-hand side variables. More formally:
E(µit/Xi1...XiT,Dij1...DijT,θi) = 0 (13)
The estimation is done in two parts. First the role of comparative advantage under the
assumption of perfect information is examined. Then the combined impact of comparative
advantage and learning is estimated under the assumption of imperfect information.
10A proof of the necessity of this constraint is given in Lemieux (1998).
10Under the assumption of perfect information, the random shock uit drops from the error
term of equation (6). The elimination of θi resulting from the quasi-diﬀerence corrects the
problem of endogeneity in the assignment of workers to ranks. The equation still needs to be
instrumented due to the presence of lagged wage on the right-hand side, correlated with µit−1
given (5). With imperfect information about innate ability, mobility is driven by the learning
process so Dijt is correlated with the new information obtained from the observation of current
output, uit.
Equation (13) states that conditional on observed innate ability, individual characteristics
and rank assignments each period are uncorrelated with the error term in the wage equation
(6). Therefore, this condition provides a set of potentially valid instruments with the property
that they are not correlated with the µ terms in the e term from equation (8).
In the perfect information case, given the assumption of workers’ comparative advantage
in a given job rank and the fact that wages are linearly related to eﬀective ability, the history
of previous period rank assignment should help predict wages. In particular, interaction terms
between Dijt−1 and Dijt help predict wijt−1. Consider a high and a low ability worker with the
same experience and the same rank in period t−1. Because of diﬀerent levels of innate ability,
the workers have diﬀerent wages and so contemporaneous rank assignment is not informative
enough to identify diﬀerences in wages. On the other hand, the high ability worker may be at
the level of eﬀective ability required to get promoted next period. Therefore, having additional
information on next period rank helps to make inferences on each worker’s ability level (for a
given level of experience) and therefore on their wage.
Under imperfect information, expected innate ability evolves over time as beliefs change. In
this case, changes in expected eﬀective ability resulting from a positive (or negative) realization
of uit aﬀect rank assignment and therefore Dijt. To ﬁnd instruments for Dijt, one can rely on
the characteristics of the martingale process for beliefs. Agents have rational expectations so
changes in beliefs are serially uncorrelated. Therefore Dijt−1 and also Dijt−2 are not correlated
with uit as they result from the realizations of uit−1 and uit−2 respectively. Moreover as before,
condition (13) applies so they are not correlated with the µ’s error terms of the wage equation.
They then represent potentially valid instruments for Dijt. The interaction between Dijt−2
and Dijt−1 constitutes a good predictor of current rank aﬃliation because it helps identify
diﬀerences in expected ability in period t − 1 (using the same argument as in the perfect
information case) as well as in period t. 11
11Given the martingale hypothesis for the evolution of the beliefs, expected ability at the beginning of period
t (before the realization of output in t) is not expected to be diﬀerent from expected ability at t − 1.
11A ﬁnal consideration in the speciﬁcation of the model involves the choice of a functional
form for
f(xit)
f(xit−1), the ratio of accumulated experience in t compared to t−1, which appears in
the estimation equation under both the perfect and imperfect information cases. The Mincer
wage equation speciﬁes log wages as a polynomial function of experience, implying that the
level of wages is an exponential function of experience. Since wages here are in levels, it is
reasonable to assume an exponential function of this same polynomial in experience. This
leads to the following functional form for the ratio g(xit) =
f(xit)
f(xit−1) : 12
g(xit) = b0e−b1xit (14)
This ratio links to the model’s predictions of serial correlation in wage increases and promo-
tions in the following way. According to the wage equation (5), it is the experience accumulation
term f which, interacted with ability θ, drives the results on serial correlation in wage increases
and promotions (low and high ability workers accumulate experience at diﬀerent rates). In
terms of the ratio (14), an estimated coeﬃcient b1 diﬀerent from 0 and b0 diﬀerent from unity
shows evidence of experience accumulation (or a non constant function f) and as a result,
evidence of serial correlation in wage increases and promotions. On the other hand, a constant
function f (corresponding to an estimated ratio of one) implies that individual unobserved
(or unmeasured) ability does not aﬀect the rate of human capital accumulation. This in turn
implies an absence of serial correlation in wage increases and promotions.
In terms of the interpretation of the remaining parameters, the Gibbons and Waldman
model predicts that if comparative advantage based on unmeasured ability matters, the slope
parameters cj will be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one another. Because unmeasured ability is
likely to be correlated with measured ability, one expects the same result for the βj. One also
expects the magnitude of these parameters to increase from lowest for the lower job level to
highest for the top job level, reﬂecting the diﬀerences in sensitivity of the diﬀerent job levels
to ability. The constant terms dj should also be signiﬁcant from one another and, due to the
characterization of the technology, should rank from higher in the lowest job rank to lower in
the highest one.
3 The Data
The data for the analysis come from the German Socio-Economic Panel. The GSOEP is a
representative longitudinal study of private households conducted every year in Germany since
12Assuming f(xit) = e
α0+α1xit−α2x2
it and given that xit = xit−1 + 1 then g(xit) = e
α1+α2−2α2xit .
121984. The panel used in this paper spans the years 1985 to 1996 because information on
workers mobility is not available in 1984. Since the period covers the German reuniﬁcation, I
have excluded data on the former East German population to keep the pre and post uniﬁcation
samples comparable.
The GSOEP is unique for the analysis hereafter because it provides information on move-
ments between and within ﬁrms through a question about changes in the worker’s employment
situation in the previous year. Most importantly, there is detailed information on the rank
occupied by the worker within his current occupation. These two pieces of information are
central to the study of wage and mobility dynamics within the ﬁrm. Another advantage is
that information is collected over a large sample of individuals and therefore, the analysis of
wage dynamics and intra-ﬁrm mobility can be done for a large sample ﬁrms (although survey
data do not provide as many details about ﬁrm characteristics as for individuals).
3.1 Variable and Data Selection
The GSOEP provides information on individual characteristics such as age, education, sex,
marital status, nationality and employment status. Wages are given on a monthly basis,
corresponding to the month preceding the time of the survey. 13
Firm characteristics include the type of industry, whether the ﬁrm belongs to the public
sector, ﬁrm size and the duration of the employment contract (unlimited or limited length).
Information about unionization is not available on a longitudinal basis as the question is asked
only twice over the sample period (1989 and 1993). Although I cannot control for the presence
of unions, the variable indicating whether individuals work in a public or private sector ﬁrm
should partially pick up diﬀerences in wage policies between unionized and non unionized
ﬁrms. Moreover, given that unions have a predominant impact in the German economy at
the industry and national level, controlling for treatment diﬀerences for unionized and non-
unionized workers across ﬁrms is not as critical as it would be in an economy where both play
a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent role at the ﬁrm level.
I have selected individuals aged between 20 and 65 who are working at the time of the
survey on a full-time basis. I have excluded self-employed workers and put a restriction on
wages excluding any observations below 500 DM per month. 14 The resulting sample contains
13I used wages after deductions for tax and social security because it is the earning variable most frequently
reported.
14Since in Germany, the minimum wage varies by industry, this bound should give a reasonable minimum in
1332492 observations (6171 workers). Appendix A describes the data selection in more details
and provides sample means of the main variables used in the analysis hereafter.
The GSOEP contains two sources of information to describe workers’ careers within a ﬁrm.
First, the survey contains a question on job changes. Each year, individuals are asked to report
whether they have experienced a change in job situation since the previous year’s survey. This
question makes it possible to identify workers’ careers within and across ﬁrms. 15 Appendix B1
provides information on inter and intra ﬁrm mobility frequencies by experience and associated
wage growth. Overall, 11.2% of the observations report mobility, 2.9% of the observations
report intra-ﬁrm mobility. Although intra-ﬁrm mobility is low, it is comparable to the U.S. as
a proportion of the total reported moves. 16
Second, there is a question in which individuals are asked to identify their current position
with a choice among ﬁve categories: blue-collar, white-collar, civil servant, trainee and self-
employed. I considered the ﬁrst three given that self-employment is not relevant for the analysis
and that the trainee category is not in itself an occupation. 17 Each position is subdivided into
a hierarchical structure of job levels or ranks according to the level of skills and responsibilities
required for the job. Appendix B2 describes in more details the occupational rank variables
and provides average characteristics by job changes and rank changes.
3.2 Summary Statistics on Intra-Firm Mobility and Wage Outcomes
A natural starting point before assessing the importance of the comparative advantage and
learning assumptions in explaining mobility and wage dynamics is to see whether the German
data exhibit the stylized facts of the U.S. data which motivated the Gibbons and Waldman
model.
Because the question on job change within the ﬁrm does not provide information on the
type of job change experienced, I use the information on job rank comparing current and
previous job rank to categorize job changes as promotions. 18 Table 1 presents average wage
order to exclude outliers for wages without losing observations on low wage workers such as trainees.
15When considering the sample of workers remaining with their ﬁrm over the period (reporting either a
job change within the ﬁrm or no change in job situation), the sample size becomes 11159 observations (3487
workers).
16McCue (1996) uses the PSID and ﬁnds that about 1/4 of the reported moves are promotions within a ﬁrm.
17Individuals identiﬁed as trainees at any point during the sample period were excluded unless they reported
the occupation for which they were training.
18The question on job change is used to identify the sub-sample of workers who remain within their ﬁrms,
14growth by type of job change and rank change for workers who do not change ﬁrms. The
ﬁrst two columns report average wage growth for those who changed jobs within the ﬁrm and
those who did not. The last three present average wage growth of job changers by type of job
changes.
Not surprisingly, the main diﬀerence associated with a change in rank among job changers
is the average wage growth which is 16.25% for workers who receive promotions. 19 Like the
ﬁndings for the U.S, this suggests that hierarchical rank eﬀects play an important role in the
wage determination process in German ﬁrms. There is also evidence that previous wage growth
predict promotions. The average wage growth the period before a reported change in rank or
job (columns 3 or 2) is higher than it is when there is no change in rank or job (column 5 or
column 1).
Note that the percentage of changes involving a change to a lower rank is high relative
to previous ﬁndings on demotions. However, these changes are associated with positive wage
growth suggesting that they may not in fact be demotions and may instead result from misclas-
siﬁcation in job ranks. This would not be surprising given the known sensitivity of survey data
to this type of problem. Given that rank changes are central to the estimation of the Gibbons
and Waldman model, I corrected for possible classiﬁcation errors using the information on job
changes and wage growth. 20 The resulting data, which will be used for the remaining of the
analysis, present similar average characteristics for ﬁrms and individuals as the one without
corrections. Average wage growth associated with demotion is now lower (-1.52%) and average
wage growth with no change in rank (but a change in job) is now higher (4.67%).
To see whether there is evidence of individual variation in wages within a rank, I compare
average wage growth at promotion with the diﬀerence in average wages for workers in two
consecutive ranks. To do so, I need to compute wage growth at promotion at the diﬀerent
ranks. Because rank deﬁnitions and subdivisions are similar across the three occupations
considered, they can be summarized in a single hierarchical job ladder using the following 4
generic rank deﬁnitions: 21
either experiencing no change in job or a change within.
19Note also that job changers that do not experience a change in rank receive on average a wage growth of
2.94% which is higher than the average wage growth associated with no change in job suggesting that part of
the change in job would be pay related.
20Details about the correction method and resulting changes in the data are presented in Appendix B3.
21The blue-collar occupation is originally divided into 5 ranks, distinguishing unskilled from semi-skilled work.
I grouped the two categories into one corresponding to the lower occupational rank. See appendix B for details
151. Low rank = unskilled or semi-skilled work
2. Middle rank = skilled work
3. Upper rank = highly skilled work
4. Executive rank = executive work
Table 2 presents average wage growth associated with transitions from one rank to the next
between two periods for all workers and by occupation. The diagonal shows the average wage
growth of workers who did not change rank. The last column computes the average wage (in
level) of all workers in a given rank at time t. Note that average wage growth associated with
a promotion is slightly higher for promotion from the middle to the upper rank and upper
to executive rank than it is for the low to middle rank. On the other hand, there remains
individual variations in wage changes within each rank. Comparing the diﬀerence in wage
level between rank L and M, there is a diﬀerence of 483 marks, which corresponds to a 30%
diﬀerence in average wage between the two ranks. It is 57% between rank M and U and 24%
between U and EX.
Concerning the evidence on serial correlation in wage increases and promotions, the analysis
is limited by the fact that the sample period is not long enough to observe several episodes of
mobility per worker. On average, the number of years workers stay in the sample is about 8
years. Over that period, the average number of time a worker experience a change is 1.1. As
a result, the sample size when considering the workers who experience a change twice or more
is very small. This limits the possibility of making reliable inferences on serial correlation in
promotions and wage increases.
Summarizing the ﬁndings, average wage growth at promotion is higher than without pro-
motion but is lower than the average diﬀerence in wage growth between two consecutive ranks.
There is also some evidence that previous wage growth predicts promotion as previous pe-
riod average wage growth for those experiencing a promotion or a job change the following
period is higher than for those experiencing no change in job within the ﬁrm. These ﬁndings
suggest that promotion to a higher rank plays an important role in the wage determination
process in German ﬁrms. The last two ﬁndings suggest that individual-speciﬁc variations in
wage changes are also important. Overall, these ﬁndings show evidence that individual and
job characteristics are both important factors in determining wage outcomes within German
ﬁrms.
on the occupational rank variables.
16This preliminary look at the data suggests that German data seem to share some of the
same stylized facts as the U.S. data which makes it worth pursuing the analysis by estimating
the Gibbons and Waldman model using these data. According to the model, the joint eﬀects
of job and individual characteristics in the wage determination process can be explained by
the assumption of the workers’ comparative advantage in a given rank and the fact that
individual skills are diﬀerently rewarded in each rank. Going further in assessing the role
of comparative advantage, the next subsection provides preliminary evidence on the joint
impact of the rank variables and individual skills on wage outcomes. Also given the primary
role of unmeasured (by the econometrician) ability (unobserved in the case of learning) in
the Gibbons and Waldman model, the next subsection provides preliminary evidence on the
presence of unmeasured ability in the wage determination process.
3.3 Preliminary Evidence on the Role of Comparative Advantage and Un-
measured Ability
In this section, I analyze whether comparative advantage based on measured ability is im-
portant. To do so, I estimate the joint eﬀect of rank and individual characteristics in an
estimation of inter-rank wage diﬀerentials. I also consider the importance of unmeasured abil-
ity by comparing the results of an OLS estimation of the rank wage premia with the results
of a ﬁxed-eﬀect estimation. The idea is that if comparative advantage based on measured
individual characteristics matters and if there is evidence of unmeasured ability in the wage
determination process, one can expect to ﬁnd some evidence of comparative advantage based
on unmeasured ability and therefore proceed to the estimation of the Gibbons and Waldman
model.
Diﬀerences in average individual characteristics across ranks are presented in the Appendix
C Table which reports average education, potential experience, marital status, woman and
German percentages together with the raw wage diﬀerentials (relative to the lower rank) by
rank. As observed in Table 2, the wage diﬀerentials increase within job rank in diﬀerent
proportions that depend on the type of occupation, with white-collared workers showing the
highest diﬀerentials in each rank. While these rank wage premia might reﬂect the increasing
responsibilities and task complexity of higher rank jobs, there is a positive correlation between
rank premia and measures of individual ability such as education. From the results of the
appendix C Table, the link with other characteristics is however less clear. A global measure
of the workers’s individual characteristics would be more convenient for analyzing interaction
eﬀects of the worker’s ability and his job rank in the wage determination process.
17In order to obtain a global impact of individual characteristics on wages, I summarize
the individual characteristics into one variable interpreted as the worker’s skill. 22 To do so, I
estimated a regression of the log wage on education, marital status, sex, nationality, experience
and squared experience, industry and occupation type for the entire original sample of workers.
I used the estimated coeﬃcients related to education, marital status, gender, nationality and
experience to compute the estimated or predicted log wage based on these characteristics. 23
The resulting skill variable has been normalized to 0 and the average of the resulting skill index
by job rank is reported in the last column of the Appendix C Table.
Column 1 of Table 3 presents the results of a regression of wages on rank dummies with con-
trols for occupation and industry, large ﬁrm size, public sector and length of the employment
contract. Given that wages are in level, the rank coeﬃcients can be interpreted as additional
dollars value per month from being in a higher rank in the base category for the control vari-
ables. 24 Notice that those coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant and lower than the raw wage diﬀerentials
of the Appendix C Table with no controls for worker and ﬁrm characteristics.
Column 2 of Table 3 considers the impact of adding the skill variable on rank eﬀects. 25
On can see that controlling for skills reduces the impact of the rank dummies but that they
remain signiﬁcant and important.
In order to assess the presence of unmeasured (by the econometrician) individual ability,
the next column of Table 3 presents the results of a ﬁxed-eﬀect estimation. Assuming that
unobserved individual heterogeneity is time invariant and equally valued in the diﬀerent ranks,
it is possible to eliminate (or control for) this term by using ﬁrst diﬀerence method. If un-
measured ability does not matter in the determination of wages, the ﬁxed-eﬀect estimation
results should be similar to the OLS results. One can see from Column 3 that the ﬁxed-eﬀect
coeﬃcients on ranks signiﬁcantly lower, and remain signiﬁcant. This suggests that part of the
rank wage premia is explained by unmeasured ability and part of it still reﬂects rank eﬀects.
22Given the focus on the role of comparative advantage, this technique, also used in the studies mentioned
earlier applying the quasi-diﬀerence and IV method, provides a way to minimize the number of parameters to
be estimated.
23To remain consistent with the Gibbons and Waldman model which focuses on expected productivity equals
to wages in level, the skill variable (estimated with the wage in log) is the exponential of the predicted log wage.
24The base category for occupation and industry is blue collars in the mining and quarrying industry. The
dummy for large ﬁrm size is one for ﬁrms with more than 500 workers.
25Given that the skill variable is the exponential of the predicted wages, regressing wages on the log of the
skill variable would give a coeﬃcient of 1.
18The notion that workers have a comparative advantage in some job ranks is equivalent to
saying that skills are diﬀerently rewarded along the successive rungs of the job ladder, and
that workers sort into a given rank according to their level of ability or skills. Column 4 of
Table 3 considers the possibility that comparative advantage and non random selection operate
on measured skills. To take this into account, I added interactions of the skill index and the
worker’s job rank to the baseline regression of column 1. One can see that the coeﬃcients
on the interactions are signiﬁcant. A test of equality of these coeﬃcients shows a value of
2.09) for the χ2(3) statistic. This shows evidence of the existence of distinct evaluations of
measured skills in each rank. Finally, column (5) shows the results of a ﬁxed-eﬀect estimation
of the speciﬁcation with comparative advantage in column (4). The rank coeﬃcients decreases
substantially compared to column (4) and resemble more those of column (3) obtained with a
ﬁxed-eﬀect estimation. This suggests that unmeasured ability matters, even in the presence of
comparative advantage based on measurable skills.
The second panel of Table 3 show the results of a similar analysis applied to the sub-
sample of workers in the private sector only. Results are very similar to those based on the
entire sample. Given that a larger majority of workers in the private sector experience a change
in rank, 26 the similarity in the results is not surprising.
This section has shown evidence that workers self-select into the diﬀerent levels having a
comparative advantage in a given level based on their level of measured skills. In addition, the
results of the ﬁrst diﬀerence estimation lead us to suspect that unmeasured ability may also
matter in the explanation of the inter-rank wage diﬀerentials and thus, in the wage dynamics
within ﬁrms.
These results are consistent with the Gibbons and Waldman framework of analysis of wage
and mobility dynamics inside ﬁrms. Given that unmeasured ability is likely to be correlated
with measured ability, it is reasonable to expect to ﬁnd evidence on the fact that workers also
have a comparative advantage based on unmeasured ability. The next section presents the
results based on the Gibbons and Waldman model speciﬁcation presented in Section 2.
4 Results
This section proceeds in three parts. The ﬁrst part presents the estimation of the comparative
advantage and learning eﬀects on wage dynamics for the sample of workers staying with their
26See Appendix Table B2.1
19ﬁrms. The second part describes the results in terms of the validity and predictive power of the
instruments. The last part compares wage and mobility dynamics within and between ﬁrms
estimating the eﬀects of comparative advantage and learning on the sample consisting of ﬁrm
stayers and ﬁrm changers.
4.1 Comparative Advantage and Learning Within Firms
The estimation results, shown in Table 4, are presented in two parts. First, equation (8) is
estimated under the assumption of perfect information to emphasize the impact of comparative
advantage on θi, observed by the market but unmeasured by the econometrician. Second,
the estimation is performed for the model under imperfect information about θi, where both
comparative advantage and learning eﬀects are possible.
Results from the ﬁrst part of Table 4 conﬁrm the importance of the non random selection
of workers based on unmeasured ability. The cj coeﬃcients which evaluate the impact of
unmeasured ability in each rank j are all signiﬁcant. More importantly for the comparative
advantage hypothesis, they are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one another. The joint test for
equality of slopes shows a value of 9.36 for the χ2(3) statistics which is signiﬁcant at the 5%
level. The coeﬃcients related to measured skills by rank (the βj) are still signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from one another (χ2(3) of 9.71 for the joint test) implying that comparative advantage based
on measured ability is still important. Compared to column (4) of Table 3 however, the impact
is smaller when comparative advantage based on unmeasured ability is controlled for.
For rank to rank diﬀerences in the coeﬃcients on measured and unmeasured ability, the
eﬀect of unmeasured ability is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between the middle and upper rank (χ2
of 5.11 signiﬁcant at the 5% level) implying that it is at that level of the job hierarchy that
comparative advantage based on unmeasured ability plays the most signiﬁcant role. From the
results on measured skills, rank to rank diﬀerences in coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant between the
lower and middle rank of the hierarchy. Together these results suggest that measured and
unmeasured ability play signiﬁcant roles in determining the assignment of workers into ranks,
but have diﬀerent eﬀects at diﬀerent levels of the job hierarchy with unmeasured ability being
important when moving to the upper part of the hierarchy while measured skills are important
when moving from the lower to middle part. Note that the pure rank eﬀects, dj’s, all remain
signiﬁcant implying that measured and unmeasured skills are not the only determinants of
wage increases.
Given the diﬀerent patterns of transition between ranks for blue and white collared workers
20shown in appendix Table B2.2 with a higher proportion of blue-collar moving from the low
to the middle level and a higher proportion of white-collars moving from the middle to upper
level, the diﬀerent impacts of measured and unmeasured skills at diﬀerent levels of the job hier-
archy suggest that measured skills would be more important in the assignment of blue-collared
workers whereas unmeasured ability would be more important for white-collared workers.
The second panel of Table 4 show the estimation results when learning about unobserved
innate ability is introduced. One can see that assuming that mobility is generated by learning
about unobserved ability changes substantially the preceding results. Overall, the coeﬃcients
are less precisely estimated with most of the standard errors doubling in magnitude. None of
the tests of equality in the slope coeﬃcients reject the null implying no evidence of comparative
advantage.
These results cast some doubt on the ability of the learning hypothesis to be supported by
the data. Note that with the introduction of learning, the pure rank eﬀects cease to be signif-
icant. Taken in isolation this result would suggest that mobility generated by learning about
unobserved ability explains all of the rank eﬀects in the wage dynamics. On the other hand, it
is diﬃcult to reconcile with the absence of evidence on the workers’ comparative advantage in
a given rank. A better explanation for this result would be that mobility of German workers
across ranks is not important enough to identify any diﬀerential rank eﬀects, either pure rank
eﬀects or diﬀerential skills and ability eﬀects across ranks. This result is consistent with Bauer
and Haisken-Denew (2001) who use the same data to analyze the covariance structure of wages
resulting from learning about workers’ unobserved ability and do not ﬁnd evidence of learning
eﬀects in the estimated covariance structure.
Concerning the estimation of the human capital ratio, in both speciﬁcations, the results
correspond to the estimation of a ratio deﬁned as a constant b0. Estimations based on the
functional form given in (14), either using experience or tenure with the ﬁrm, all lead to an
estimated ratio close to 1 with the b0 estimate varying between 0.99 and 1.01 and the b1
estimate of .001 suggesting the ratio is independent of experience or tenure. 27 For that reason
I re-estimated the model focusing on the estimation of the constant term in (14) and present
the results associated with a simpler functional form deﬁned as the constant b0.
From the two panels of Table 4, one can see that the ratio is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
but not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from unity. As mentioned previously, a ratio of unity implies
that the function of accumulation of human capital (proxied by years of experience) is constant
27Results available upon request.
21over time and across individuals. This implies that serial correlation in wage increases and
promotion is not a prediction supported by the data. These results are in line with other
studies using survey data. 28
Summarizing the results, the dynamics of wages within German ﬁrms reﬂect the importance
of non random selection of workers into the diﬀerent rungs of the ﬁrm’s job ladder. Measured
and unmeasured ability both play an important role in the workers’ assignment into ranks with
unmeasured ability being more important at higher levels of the hierarchical job structure.
There is no evidence of learning eﬀects generating workers mobility across ranks. Neither
is there evidence of serial correlation in wage increases and promotion. These results are not
surprising given the few episodes of mobility of German workers observed in the data. This in
turn may result from the importance of the apprenticeship system in Germany, in which ﬁrms
and individuals can learn about the quality of the employment relationship before individuals
ﬁnish school and enter the job market, reducing the need to experience job mobility to learn
about individual ability. It may also result from collective bargaining agreements which may
regulate the workers’ career progression.
To assess the robustness of the preceding results, the next Section presents the results of
tests performed to establish the validity of the instruments as well as their predictive power in
explaining the variables instrumented.
4.2 Instruments
In the estimation of the perfect information model with comparative advantage, the variables
used to instrument previous period wage (other than the exogenous right hand side variables
of the wage equation) correspond to the interactions in job rank at t-1 and t. This choice of
instrument is based on the idea that eﬀective ability, as deﬁned in (1)according to the Gibbons
and Waldman model, and therefore wages diﬀer among workers because of innate ability. As
a result, the way to capture diﬀerences in innate ability and therefore in wages is through the
observation of the worker’s career path.
When learning is considered, current job rank and previous period wage have to be in-
strumented. Rank aﬃliation in t − 1 and t − 2 helps predict current aﬃliation using the same
argument about the informativeness of the worker’s career path to capture diﬀerences in innate
ability. As mentioned previously, diﬀerences in innate ability help predict wages and, in the
28Abowd and Card (1989) and Topel and Ward (1992)
22case of the model with imperfect information, also explain the worker’s rank aﬃliation each
period.
To analyze the predictive power of these instruments, I performed a F-test for the joint
signiﬁcance of the instruments when the instrumented variables (previous wage on the one
hand and current rank on the other) are regressed on the instruments and including all the
exogenous variables in the right-hand side of the wage equation. The Appendix D table shows
the results of the test. One can conclude from the table that rank aﬃliation either between
t − 1 and t or t − 2 and t − 1 are good instruments for the worker’s current job rank and the
previous period’s wage.
In terms of the validity of the instruments used to perform the estimation, note that in the
estimations with comparative advantage, the overidentiﬁcation test rejects the hypothesis that
the instruments used are valid. Because this might be due to the importance of classiﬁcation
errors in rank between two periods, I re-estimated the model using a second rather than a ﬁrst
quasi-diﬀerence of the wage equation. 29 The idea is that if classiﬁcation errors are important
and if they are serially uncorrelated, one can re-estimate the model and ﬁnd similar results
when comparing observations in t and t − 2. Results are presented in table 5.
Results on the coeﬃcients are similar to those of Table 4 implying that the preceding results
on comparative advantage and learning still hold. On the other hand, the result on the validity
of the instruments are better. The value of the statistic has substantially decreased suggesting
that it is sensitive to mis-classiﬁcations in rank.30 It also suggests that if there are errors in
rank classiﬁcations, they don’t seem to be serially correlated.
29False classiﬁcations may aﬀect the estimated value of the objective function through the estimation of the
weighting matrix as the covariance of the moments. See Altonji and Segal (1996) for an analysis of the small
sample properties of the GMM estimator when the weighting matrix is the variance of the moments. Since the
statistic of the overidentiﬁcation test is a linear function of the value function, conclusions from the test may
be sensitive to the presence of classiﬁcation errors in ranks.
30Another possibility is related to the model’s assumption of a single ability index to generate non random
selection and learning. Given the possibility of transitions between non consecutive ranks, there exists several
identiﬁcation strategies to estimate the rank coeﬃcients which leads to the failure of the overidentiﬁcation test.
See Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux and Parent (2002) for a discussion of this point. Here however, there are too few
transitions between non consecutive ranks to consider this as a possible explanation for the high value of the
estimated objective function.
234.3 Comparative Advantage and Learning Within and Between Firms
In the analysis so far, I have considered the sample of workers remaining with their ﬁrms. As
a result, the bjθi term representing the quality of the match worker-rank is deﬁned as being
ﬁrm-speciﬁc. It would be interesting to see whether the unmeasured θ term that is driving
the results is transferable across ﬁrms (that is, individual rather than ﬁrm-speciﬁc). Using the
information on job changes, I re-estimate the model over the sample of workers moving within
and between ﬁrms. Results are presented in Table 6.
Results are similar to those obtained using the sample of ﬁrm stayers. The similarity in
the results over the two samples suggests that the unmeasured quality of the match between
a worker and his rank would be more individual than ﬁrm-speciﬁc. Note that the analysis is
based on survey data which do not allow one to identify ﬁrms and therefore to control for ﬁrm
unobserved heterogeneity. Having matched employer-employee data with similar information
on job mobility and hierarchical job structure as in the GSOEP would allow for more precise
conclusions about individual versus ﬁrm speciﬁcity in the unmeasured quality term driving the
self-selection of workers into ranks.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I have analyzed the relative importance of diﬀerent factors explaining the dy-
namics of wages and workers mobility within ﬁrms with data from the German Socio-Economic
Panel survey over the years 1986 to 1996. Using survey data for a large sample of workers
within their ﬁrm, I can draw conclusions on the common features arising from the relationship
between workers’ career inside the ﬁrm and wage outcomes over a large sample of ﬁrms. In
addition, the longitudinal aspect of the data allows me to study wage and mobility dynamics.
A preliminary analysis of the data shows that, similarly to the U.S. ﬁndings on career and
wage outcomes inside ﬁrms, average wage growth at promotion is higher than without promo-
tion. At the same time, individual diﬀerences in wages seem to remain important within each
level of the job hierarchy as average wage growth at promotion is lower than the percentage
diﬀerence in average wages between two job levels. There is also some evidence that wage
growth predicts promotion as average previous-period wage growth is higher for those experi-
encing a promotion (or a change in job) the following period than for those who do not. On
the other hand, the data show that German workers experience very few episodes of successive
mobility within the ﬁrm over the sample period.
24From the estimation of the model, the dynamics of wages within German ﬁrms reveal the
importance of unmeasured (by the econometrician) ability driving the assignment of workers
to the diﬀerent rungs of the ﬁrm’s job ladder with higher ability workers assigned to the
top level positions. On the other hand, I do not ﬁnd evidence that learning about workers
unobserved ability generates mobility across job levels. This may be due to the importance
of the apprenticeship system in Germany in which most of the learning about the quality of
the match worker-ﬁrm would take place before individuals ﬁnish school. Finally, the results
obtained when including ﬁrm changers are similar to those over the sample of ﬁrm stayers.
This suggests that the unmeasured quality of the match between the worker and his job level
in the job hierarchy is not entirely ﬁrm-speciﬁc.
The results of this paper show the importance of the question of assignment of workers to
job ranks on our understanding of wage dynamics within as well as between ﬁrms. The evidence
on the presence of non-random selection of workers onto the rungs of the job ladder brings an
additional explanation for the fact that the distribution of wages diﬀer from the distribution
of individual productivity at the level of the ﬁrm. These results show that wage dynamics
within the ﬁrm depend not only on the worker’s ability (innate ability or quality of the match
worker-ﬁrm) but also on how productive this ability (or match) is within a speciﬁc job rank.
The importance of self-selection of workers based on unmeasured ability in the determination
of German wages may seem surprising given that the German labor market is regulated by
unions and employers’ associations which would suggest that pay settings are more related
to bureaucratic rules. On the other hand, pure rank wage premia remain signiﬁcant even
after controlling for measured and unmeasured individual heterogeneity. This would suggest
that administrative rules resulting from collective bargaining agreements remains a signiﬁcant
factor explaining the wage dynamics within German ﬁrms.
The estimation of the model of Gibbons and Waldman over a large sample of ﬁrms made
it possible to draw general conclusions on the common features characterizing mobility and
wage dynamics for German workers. It would obviously be interesting to compare them with
US data. To my knowledge, there is no American survey data with a question on the job rank
of the worker. However, it would be possible to construct variables on job levels by using the
three-digit codes from the U.S. Census which provide a detailed classiﬁcation of occupations.
Future research should investigate this issue because if the model of Gibbons and Waldman
provides a reasonable explanation of wage dynamics in German ﬁrms it may be even more
relevant in U.S. ﬁrms (where the mobility of workers, on which the model is based, is higher
than in Germany).
25One limitation of the analysis comes from the fact that survey data includes many heteroge-
nous ﬁrms. While the analysis controls for the main characteristics of ﬁrms, it does not address
the question of unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity which may play a signiﬁcant role in the deter-
mination of the wage and mobility processes inside ﬁrms. Using matched employer-employee
data would make it possible to correct for that aspect.
The model of Gibbons and Waldman is based on the assumption that all ﬁrms are identical
with the same production technology and hierarchical job structure. Future research could
investigate the possibility that ﬁrms of diﬀerent size diﬀer in their internal organization as
suggested by the empirical evidence on the impact of ﬁrm size on wage outcomes (see for
example Brown and Medoﬀ (1989) and Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999)). In this case,
the productivity of a given worker-job-level match would be diﬀerent in large and small ﬁrms.
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29Table 1: Average Current and Lagged Wage growth by Type of Intra-ﬁrm Mobilitya
Job Change Job and Rank Changeb
No Yes Upc Down Same
Current Wage Growthd (%) 1.92 6.02 16.25 3.84 2.94
(0.001) (0.009) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01)
Previousd Wage Growth (%) 2.54 5.93 5.10 4.53 4.70
(0.001) (0.008) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Frequencye of Observations 91.6 2.9 21.7 8.2 70.1
a-Based on a sample of 11159 observations (3487 workers). Standard errors in parenthesis.
b- Rank change conditional on reported intra-ﬁrm job change.
c-Rank change up (down or same) is a dummy indicating a higher (lower or same) rank
in period t compared to t-1.
d-Average diﬀerence in log wages between t and t-1 for current growth and t-2 and t-1 for
previous wage growth. The period t-1 is the period before reported job (and rank) change.
f-The percentages for the ﬁrst two columns on job change do not add up to 100 because
frequencies are computed over the total sample which also includes between ﬁrms job changers.
Table 2: Averagea Wage Growth by Rank Transitionsb
t-1 Low Medium Upper EXec. Average
t Wagec
Low All 0.89 (.002) - - - 1.610
Blue-collar 0.78 (.002) - - - 1.674
White-collar 1.16 (.005) - - - 1.451
Civil servant 2.25 (.018) - - - 2.172
Medium All 15.99 (.008) 1.83 (.002) - - 2.093
Blue-collar 15.82 (.008) 1.89 (.003) - - 2.105
White-collar 16.19 (.015) 1.74 (.003) - - 2.054
Civil servant 14.43 (.062) 2.42(.006) - - 2.430
Upper All - 18.93 (.015) 2.37 (.004) - 3.287
Blue-collar - 22.08 (.026) 1.10 (.011) - 2.548
White-collar - 19.06 (.020) 2.70 (.005) - 3.537
Civil servant - 9.05 (.025) 2.35 (.006) - 3.160
EXec. All - - 18.10 (.030) 3.33 (.005) 4.106
Blue-collar - - 31.1 (.160) 8.48 (.024) 2.860
White-collar - - 16.65 (.035) 4.12 (.010) 4.331
Civil servant - - 14.73 (.018) 2.52 (.006) 4.174
a-Based on a sample of 11159 observations (3487 workers). Standard errors in parenthesis.
b-Transitions from rank j in period t − 1 to rank j
0 > j in period t ,j,j
0 =(L,M,U,EX).
c-Monthly wage (after tax) in levels in thousands of marks. Average over all workers in rank j at time t.
30Table 3: Estimation of Rank Wage Diﬀerentials
Modelsa (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variablesb OLS OLS Fixed-Eﬀect OLS with CA Fixed-Eﬀect with CA
All Firms
Skill - 1.747*** 1.758*** - -
(0.044) (0.150)
Rank L - - - -
Rank M 0.366*** 0.157*** 0.086*** 0.172*** 0.092***
(0.019) (0.017) (0.015) (0.019) (0.016)
Rank U 1.445*** 0.813*** 0.364*** 0.818*** 0.344***
(0.043) (0.042) (0.022) (0.043) (0.024)
Rank EX 2.311*** 1.281*** 0.580*** 1.250*** 0.508***
(0.078) (0.079) (0.035) (0.124) (0.043)
Skill*Rank L - - - 1.658*** 1.520***
(0.052) (0.165)
Skill*Rank M - - - 1.722*** 1.535***
(0.065) (0.157)
Skill*Rank U - - - 1.810*** 1.898***
(0.089) (0.154)
Skill*Rank EX - - - 1.852*** 2.065***
(0.188) (0.174)
Adj. R2 0.49 0.64 0.94 0.64 0.94
Private Sectorc
Skill - 1.929*** 1.799*** - -
(0.053) (0.150)
Rank L - - - -
Rank M 0.376*** 0.132*** 0.071*** 0.170*** 0.075***
(0.022) (0.019) (0.017) (0.021) (0.018)
Rank U 1.503*** 0.768*** 0.363*** 0.794*** 0.334***
(0.056) (0.017) (0.025) (0.017) (0.027)
Rank EX 2.203*** 1.358*** 0.514*** 0.891*** 0.469***
(0.152) (0.127) (0.041) (0.151) (0.052)
Skill*Rank L - - - 1.730*** 1.594***
(0.060) (0.195)
Skill*Rank M - - - 1.841*** 1.595***
(0.082) (0.184)
Skill*Rank U - - - 2.032*** 2.033***
(0.121) (0.186)
Skill*Rank EX - - - 3.808*** 2.067***
(0.453) (0.218)
Adj. R2 0.45 0.61 0.94 0.62 0.94
a-Dependent variable is wage in level in thousands of marks. Standard errors have been computed using
the White correction.
b-Also included are dummies for the type of contract, large ﬁrm size, public sector,
occupations, industries and years.
Sub-sample of 8511 observations.
31Table 4: Wage Dynamics Within Firmsa
Comparative Advantage
Speciﬁcationb 1 Low Middle Upper EXecutive
Rank L Rank M Rank U Rank EX
Rank Dummies dL dM dU dEX
- 0.208*** 0.499*** 0.695***
(0.029) (0.044) (0.088)
Skill*Ranks
Unmeasured cL cM cU cEX
1 0.932*** 1.261*** 1.467***
(0.080) (0.131) (0.223)
Measured βL βM βU βEX
0.813*** 1.154*** 1.087*** 1.159***




Testsc for Equality Joint M=L U=M EX=U
of Slopes cj 9.36 (0.02) 0.58 (0.44) 5.11 (0.02) 0.89 (0.34)
of Slopes βj 9.71 (0.02) 9.69 (0.00) 0.27 (0.60) 0.11 (0.73)
of Ratio b0 = 1 0.00 (0.969)
Overidentiﬁcation Test 108.15 (0.00)
Comparative Advantage and Learning
Speciﬁcationb 2 Low Middle Upper EXecutive
Rank L Rank M Rank U Rank EX
Ranks dL dM dU dEX
- 0.065 0.008 0.11
(0.083) (0.233) (0.17)
Skill*Ranks
Unobserved cL cM cU cEX
1 1.119*** 1.556*** 1.793***
(0.254) (0.384) (0.468)
Measured βL βM βU βEX
0.908** 0.716** 0.890*** 0.770




Testsc for Equality Joint M=L U=M EX=U
of Slopes cj 3.03 (0.38) 0.22 (0.63) 1.22 (0.27) 0.57 (0.44)
of Slopes βj 0.62 (0.89) 0.37 (0.54) 0.17 (0.68) 0.08 (0.78)
of Ratio b0 = 1 2.00 (0.15)
Overidentiﬁcation Test 56.16 (0.25)
a-Dependent variable is wage in level in thousands of marks. Also included are dummies
for the type of contract, large ﬁrm size, public sector, occupations, industries and years.
b-Estimation of Ω using the residuals from NLIV with Ω = I in a ﬁrst step. Number of
observations is 11159 in the comparative advantage case and 9891 in the learning case.
The instruments for previous wage in the comparative advantage case include all the rank
interactions between t and t-1 as well skills interacted with rank. In the learning case,
current rank aﬃliation is instrumented using rank aﬃliation in t-2.
32Table 5: Wagea Dynamics using Secondb Quasi-Diﬀerence
Speciﬁcationc 1 Low Middle Upper EXecutive
Rank L Rank M Rank U Rank EX
Ranks dL dM dU dEX
- 0.064* 0.189*** 0.241***
(0.035) (0.054) (0.084)
Skill*Ranks
Unmeasured cL cM cU cEX
1 0.914*** 1.228*** 1.310***
(0.099) (0.166) (0.230)
Measured βL βM βU βEX
1.146*** 1.356*** 1.206*** 1.302***




Testsc for Equality Joint M=L U=M EX=U
of Slopes cj 5.89 (0.11) 0.75 (0.39) 5.10 (0.02) 0.31 (0.57)
of Slopes βj 5.48 (0.14) 4.56 (0.03) 0.80 (0.37) 0.35 (0.55)
of Ratio b0 = 1 9.39 (0.00)
Overidentiﬁcation Test 62.42 (0.18)
Comparative Advantage and Learning
Speciﬁcationc 2 Low Middle Upper EXecutive
Rank L Rank M Rank U Rank EX
Ranks dL dM dU dEX
- 0.184*** 0.301** 0.438***
(0.067) (0.128) (0.158)
Skill*Ranks
Unobserved cL cM cU cEX
1 1.414*** 2.104*** 2.08***
(0.244) (0.367) (0.477)
Measured βL βM βU βEX
1.587*** 1.450*** 1.117*** 0.998*




Testsc for Equality Joint M=L U=M EX=U
of Slopes cj 11.73 (0.00) 2.88 (0.08) 11.29 (0.00) 0.01(0.93)
of Slopes βj 2.78 (0.42) 0.60 (0.43) 1.93 (0.16) 0.12 (0.72)
of Ratio b0 = 1 20.00 (0.99)
Overidentiﬁcation Test 57.25 (0.23)
a-Dependent variable is wage in level in thousands of marks. Also included are dummies
for the type of contract, large ﬁrm size, public sector, occupations, industries and years.
b-Estimation using variables in t and t − 2 in the wage equation.
c-Estimation of Ω using the residuals from NLIV with Ω = I in a ﬁrst step. Number of
observations is 7775 in the comparative advantage case and 6904 in the learning case.
The instruments for previous wage in the comparative advantage case include all the rank
interactions between t and t-2 as well skills interacted with rank. In the learning case,
current rank aﬃliation is instrumented using rank aﬃliation in t-3.
33Table 6: Wage Dynamics Within and Between Firmsa
Comparative Advantage
Speciﬁcationb 1 Low Middle Upper EXecutive
Rank L Rank M Rank U Rank EX
Rank Dummies dL dM dU dEX
- 0.188*** 0.469*** 0.643***
(0.034) (0.054) (0.088)
Skill*Ranks
Unmeasured cL cM cU cEX
1 1.041*** 1.461*** 1.774***
(0.107) (0.136) (0.220)
Measured βL βM βU βEX
1.522*** 1.663*** 1.772*** 2.001***




Testsc for Equality Joint M=L U=M EX=U
of Slopes cj 19.66 (0.00) 0.15 (0.70) 6.59 (0.01) 2.00 (0.15)
of Slopes βj 5.95 (0.11) 4.23 (0.04) 0.82 (0.36) 1.82 (0.18)
of Ratio b0 = 1 0.61 (0.434)
Overidentiﬁcation Test 112.48 (0.00)
Comparative Advantage and Learning
Speciﬁcationb 2 Low Middle Upper EXecutive
Rank L Rank M Rank U Rank EX
Ranks dL dM dU dEX
- 0.054 0.024 -0.04
(0.079) (0.227) (0.19)
Skill*Ranks
Unobserved cL cM cU cEX
1 1.092*** 1.449*** 1.823***
(0.223) (0.436) (0.509)
Measured βL βM βU βEX
1.223*** 1.111*** 1.308*** 0.812




Testsc for Equality Joint M=L U=M EX=U
of Slopes cj 2.80 (0.42) 0.17 (0.68) 0.70 (0.40) 1.33 (0.25)
of Slopes βj 0.62 (0.89) 0.37 (0.54) 0.17 (0.68) 0.08 (0.78)
of Ratio b0 = 1 2.00 (0.15)
Overidentiﬁcation Test 57.25 (0.23)
a-Dependent variable is wage in level in thousands of marks. Also included are dummies
for the type of contract, large ﬁrm size, public sector, occupations, industries and years.
b-Estimation of Ω using the residuals from NLIV with Ω = I in a ﬁrst step. Number of
observations is 11932 in the comparative advantage case and 10439 in the learning case.
The instruments for previous wage in the comparative advantage case include all the rank
interactions between t and t-1 as well skills interacted with rank. In the learning case,
current rank aﬃliation is instrumented using rank aﬃliation in t-2.
34Appendix A: Data Selection
This appendix details the diﬀerent steps of the data selection process. First selection on age and
employment status (full-time, regular part-time or training within the ﬁrm). Exclusion of self-employed
workers and computation of weights as relative to the mean weight. The sample size is 32493 observa-
tions (6171 workers).
Missing variables on ﬁrm characteristics (especially ﬁrm size) and corrections for intersections be-
tween industries and between occupations reduced the sample size substantially. Moreover, the con-
struction of dummies for ranks within occupations and the use of ﬁrst and second lag of the variables
lead to supplementary exclusions of observations. The ﬁnal number of observations is 11929. Further
selection of workers who remain within their ﬁrm (without change or with intra-ﬁrm job change) gives
a sample size of 11159 observations (3487 workers).
Sample Statistics (Weighted) GSOEP- All Workers
Real monthly Wage (DM 1985) after Tax 2280.9






Percentage Civil Servant 9.8
Percentage Trainees 2.5
Number of Observations 32492
Number of Individuals 6171
Sample Statistics (Weighted) GSOEP- Workers Within Firm
Real monthly Wage (DM 1985) after Tax 2177.72






Percentage Civil Servant 8.2
Number of Observations 11159
Number of Workers 3487
35Appendix B1: Job Changes Within and Across Firms
The possible answers to the question on the changes in employment situation since the preceding year
are as follows: (1) no change - (2) have a job with a new employer - (3) became self-employed - (4) have
changed position within the ﬁrm - (5) took up a job for the ﬁrst time in my life - (6) gone back to work
after a break.
I have categorized the diﬀerent changes in employment situation into four groups:“No changes”
“Separations”,“Intra-ﬁrm Mobility” and “Other”. Answers 2 and 3 are considered as separations, 4
as intra-ﬁrm mobility and 6 as other types of moves. I considered workers in the ﬁrm for at least one
period so observations on answer 5 have been excluded from the sample. Frequencies conditional on
potential experience and gender are presented in table B1.1 below.
Appendix Table B1.1: Frequency of Mobility by Experience (GSOEP)
Experience No Separation Intra-ﬁrm Other N
Change Mobility
Men
0-10 70.6 17.6 5.7 6.2 2869
11-20 87.6 7.4 3.6 1.5 5368
21-30 94.3 2.6 2.2 0.9 5483
31- 96.7 1.8 1.3 0.7 7010
Total 90.1 5.5 2.7 1.7 20730
Women
0-10 73.2 15.9 5.8 5.1 2468
11-20 84.2 6.5 3.2 6.0 2983
21-30 89.4 4.8 1.9 3.9 2955
31- 95.5 1.2 1.3 0.4 3356
Total 86.4 6.7 2.8 4.1 11762
Total 88.8 5.9 2.7 2.5 32492
On can see that 89% of the workers surveyed experience no changes in employment situation. Among
the 11% who are mobile, one half experienced separations while intra-ﬁrm mobility accounts for one
fourth of the moves. Note also that all types of mobility decline with experience. The percentage
of separations is high during the ﬁrst ten years of experience but decreases rapidly after. Intra-ﬁrm
mobility declines less rapidly than separations. Mean wage growth associated with the four categories
of changes is provided in table B1.2 below.
Appendix Table B1.2: Wage Growth Associated with Mobility (GSOEP)
Experience No Separation Internal Other N
Change Mobility
Men
0-10 .049 (.005) .113 (.02) .102 (.02) .073 (.04) .063 (.005)
11-20 .029 (.002) .072 (.01) .080 (.01) .031 (.14) .033 (.002)
21-30 .016 (.002) .059 (.03) .033 (.01) .056 (.04) .017 (.002)
31- .009 (.002) .010 (.04) .045 (.01) -.213 (.14) .010 (.002)
Total .020 (.001) .082 (.01) .071 (.008) .024 (.04) .025 (.001)
Women
0-10 .039 (.004) .125 (.02) .158 (.03) .036 (.09) .060 (.005)
11-20 .026 (.003) .111 (.03) .078 (.02) .065 (.05) .034 (.004)
21-30 .022 (.003) .048 (.02) .042 (.02) .061 (.08) .024 (.003)
31- .014 (.003) .144 (.05) .029 (.01) .149 (.04) .016 (.003)
Total .023 (.002) .107 (.01) .099 (.01) .077 (.03) .030 (.001)
Total .021 (.001) .092 (.008) .081 (.007) .048 (.03) .027 (.001)
The Table shows that average wage growth resulting from intra-ﬁrm mobility is relatively important and
quite close to the average wage growth workers experience after separations. Since separations include
moves to a new employer or to self-employment, one might suspect that most of those separations are
voluntary and therefore associated with important wage growth.
36Appendix B2: Hierarchical Job Structure Within Firms
The possible answers to the question about the individual’s current position are given below:
Blue-collar worker: White-collar worker:
1-unskilled worker 1-industry and works foreman in non tenured employment
2-semi-skilled worker 2-employee with simple duties (e.g., salesperson, clerk)
3-skilled worker 3-employee with qualiﬁed duties (e.g., bookkeeper,
4-foreman technical drawer)
5-master craftsman, foreman 4-employee with highly qualiﬁed duties (e.g., scientiﬁc ,
worker, attorney, head of department)
5-employee with managerial duties (e.g., managing
director, head of a large ﬁrm or concern)
Civil servant General Ranking for all occupations
(including judges and professional soldiers)
1-lower level Lower rank (B.C. 1 & 2, W.C. 2 and C.S. 1)
2-middle level Middle rank (B.C. 3 , W.C. 3 and C.S. 2)
3-upper level Upper rank (B.C. 4, W.C. 4 and C.S. 3)
4-executive level Executive rank (B.C. 5, W.C. 5 and C.S. 4)
Note that the ﬁrst subcategory in the white-collar case is non tenured foreman. This category is not
easily comparable to any of the subcategories of the other occupations. I therefore excluded workers
reporting in that category.
Other possible answers not considered in the analysis here are:
Trainee Self-employed
(including family members)
1-student trainee 1-self-employed farmer
2-trainee 2-self-employed academic
3-other s-e persons with or without up to 9 employees
4-other s-e persons with 10 or more employees
5-family member helping out
Self-employed workers have been excluded from the sample and individuals reporting they were trainees
without mentioning any occupations (blue-collar, white-collar or civil servant) have also been excluded
since there is no way to categorize them within the hierarchical job structure implied by the other three
occupations. Trainees that also reported being in one of the occupations below were retained.
Finally, no individuals (observations) switched occupations when switching ranks over the sample pe-
riod. This is an important point for the identiﬁcation of the rank coeﬃcients in the estimation of the
Gibbons and Waldman model. Table B2.1 below presents average characteristics by job changes.
37Appendix Table B2.1 : Average Individual Characteristics by Type of Intra-ﬁrm Mobilitya
Job Change Job Change and
No Yes No Rank Rank
Change Changeb
Education 11.72 12.93 13.31 12.05
(0.02) (0.15) (0.19) (0.28)
Age 42.57 36.33 36.34 36.48
(0.10) (0.47) (0.54) (1.00)
Experience 24.85 17.40 17.03 18.43
(0.10) (0.49) (0.55) (1.05)
Tenure 12.82 8.29 8.71 7.38
(0.08) (0.40) (0.46) (0.81)
Women (%) 40.14 39.06 43.81 27.99
(0.004) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
German (%) 90.57 95.13 97.06 90.38
(0.002) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
Blue-Collar (%) 40.41 22.99 21.73 26.55
(0.004) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
White-Collar (%) 48.48 56.55 51.55 68.15
(0.004) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
Civil Servant (%) 11.09 20.45 26.71 5.28
(0.003) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Private Sector (%) 72.60 74.30 56.14 83.95
(0.004) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Employment Contract 95.86 95.21 97.84 88.59
(0.002) (0.01) (0.009) (0.03)
Large Firms 37.23 48.37 52.29 39.51
(0.004) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05)
Wage Growth 1.92 6.02 2.94 13.97
(0.001) (0.009) (0.01) (0.01)
Number of Years in Sample 8.93 8.86 9.02 8.53
(0.02) (0.15) (0.17) (0.28)
Frequencyc 91.6 2.9 70.06 29.94
a-Based on a sample of 11159 observations (3487 workers).
b-Rank changes include change up or down. It is is a dummy indicating a higher or lower rank
in period t compared to t-1. Rank changes for those reporting a change in job.
c-The percentages do not add up to 100 because frequencies are computed over the total
sample which also includes between ﬁrms job changers.
On average, intra-ﬁrm job changers are younger, more educated and more predominantly German men.
Among the three types of occupation, white-collar workers are the most likely to experience intra-ﬁrm
job changes. Overall, 91.6% of the observations correspond to no change in job and 2.9% to a change
in job within the ﬁrm. Finally, average wage growth associated with a job change is 6.02%, more than
3 times higher than with no reported job changes (1.92%). Workers experiencing a change in rank in
addition to a change in job have similar average characteristics than job changers. About 70% of the
job changers don’t experience a change in rank and 21.5 % correspond to a change to a higher rank (or
what I deﬁne a promotion). The remaining 8.7% are changes to a lower rank which seems relatively
high for demotions but not surprising given that the analysis is based on survey data which are sensitive
to miss-classiﬁcation errors. This point is addressed in appendix B3. The main diﬀerence with a change
in rank is the associated wage growth which more than doubles.
38Rank transition frequencies are given in the table below:
Appendix Table B2.2: Intra-ﬁrm Rank Transition Frequencies
t Low Middle Upper EXec. Total
t-1
Low All 36.96 2.37 0.21 0.00 39.54
Private 41.54 2.51 0.26 0.00 44.32
Public 22.24 1.89 0.04 0.00 24.17
Blue-collar 56.87 2.62 0.35 0.00 59.84
White-collar 16.63 2.43 0.02 0.00 19.08
Civil servant 2.63 0.44 0.11 0.00 3.17
Middle All 2.40 38.62 1.27 0.07 42.37
Private 2.50 37.84 1.32 0.08 41.74
Public 2.08 41.13 1.13 0.04 44.37
Blue-collar 2.47 30.67 0.74 0.08 33.97
White-collar 2.75 51.97 2.12 0.07 56.92
Civil servant 0.33 27.79 0.77 0.00 28.88
Upper All 0.14 0.87 12.79 0.31 14.12
Private 0.19 0.93 10.60 0.28 12.00
Public 0.00 0.68 19.83 0.42 20.92
Blue-collar 0.24 0.49 4.50 0.08 5.31
White-collar 0.05 1.49 19.15 0.44 21.13
Civil servant 0.00 0.44 36.98 1.20 38.62
EXec. All 0.04 0.05 0.31 3.57 3.98
Private 0.06 0.07 0.25 1.56 1.94
Public 0 0.00 0.53 10.01 10.54
Blue-collar 0.02 0.10 0.07 0.71 0.89
White-collar 0.09 0.00 0.42 2.36 2.87
Civil servant 0.00 0.00 1.42 27.90 29.32
39Appendix B3: Job Change and Rank Variables
This appendix provides details on the procedure used to minimize classiﬁcation errors in the rank
variables and in the job change variable. 25% of the observations reporting no change in job are
associated with a change in rank ( 15% for a change up and 8% a change down). This shows inconsistency
in the information provided in the two variables on job change and rank aﬃliation. This inconsistency
results probably from errors in rank classiﬁcation (reﬂected in the high percentage of demotion and the
high average wage growth associated with these demotions).
On the other hand, it may also be the case that some of the changes in rank aﬃliation between two
periods are “true” changes and the error is in the variable indicating no change in job situation. Note
that for some years, the information on job change is provided in two separate questions. A ﬁrst question
asking whether the worker’s job situation has changed, another question asking about the type of job
change, increasing the chances of inconsistency in the answers provided. Moreover, errors in the no job
change information are suspected based on the fact that average wage growth for those who report no
change in job but for which there is a change in rank (up or down) is 3.28% which is substantially higher
than the average wage growth of the non job and non rank changers of 1.92%. Some of the reported
non job changes must in fact be job changes associated with a rank change.
To decide when to correct for a possibly false change in rank I used the information on wage growth.
Any observations about non job changers associated with a change in rank up (promotion) for which
workers are receiving a wage growth of more than 5% is treated as a real change in rank. If it is less
than 5% then it is considered as a no change in rank and the current rank is set equal to the previous
period rank. In the case of demotion, wage growth has to be less than 0 for the observation to be
considered as a change in rank.
The ﬁrst two columns of Table B3 below reports average characteristics for job changers who experience
or not a rank change with the corrections done on the rank variables. Comparing with the last two
columns of Table B2.1 (before correction), one can see that average individual characteristics and
the diﬀerences among rank changers and non rank changers did not change much implying that the
correction did not change the informational content of the sample. Only average wage growth is now
higher for rank changers and lower for non rank changers. The remaining of the analysis will be done
based on these rank corrections.
For informational purpose, average characteristics for job changers by type of rank change are presented
in the next three columns. Also since the Gibbons and Waldman model focuses on rank changes, average
characteristics by rank changes (including job change) are provided in the last three columns.
Appendix Table B3: Average Individual Characteristics by Job and/or Rank Changes
Job Change and Job Change Rank Change
No Rank Rank and Rank Change Include Job Change
Change Changeb Up Down Same Up Down Same
Education 13.24 12.13 12.19 11.39 12.38 11.88 10.76 11.76
(0.18) (0.35) (0.33) (0.51) (0.22) (0.09) (0.09) (0.03)
Age 36.62 35.73 35.63 40.74 35.85 40.56 42.93 42.40
(0.55) (1.13) (1.09) (2.30) (0.64) (0.34) (0.41) (0.11)
Women 44.01 27.74 37.68 31.38 40.82 41.03 42.82 39.87
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.004)
German 97.12 87.98 91.86 61.90 88.16 90.09 83.61 91.10
(0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.11) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.002)
Blue-Collar (%) 20.79 24.44 19.56 24.74 27.22 32.50 46.21 53.42
(0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.005)
White-Collar (%) 53.19 69.28 66.83 71.76 52.66 62.61 46.73 37.66
(0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.005)
Civil Servant (%) 26.02 6.27 13.60 3.50 20.11 4.87 7.05 8.91
(0.02) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.008) (0.007) (0.002)
Current Wage 2.63 17.34 14.40 -1.52 4.67 16.38 -8.82 1.50
Growth (%) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001)
Frequency
of Observations 80.2 19.8 21.5 8.7 69.8 6.71 4.80 88.5
40Appendix C: Average Characteristics by Rank a
Position Wage Edu. Exp. Woman German Married Skill
Diﬀb (Yr) (Yr) (%) (%) (%) Index
Blue-C
Unskilled 0 9.4 27.8 63.3 64.5 63.7 -0.23
Semi-skilled 0.37 9.8 26.8 41.1 79.2 60.8 -0.10
Skilled 0.66 10.6 22.4 9.5 89.2 49.5 0.02
Foreman 1.05 10.4 26.6 3.1 92.8 80.5 0.07
Master Crafts. 1.11 10.9 25.9 1.42 98.4 61.3 0.10
White-C
Simple duties 0 10.9 22.2 81.8 94.6 48.4 -0.26
Qualiﬁed 0.64 11.8 21.7 62.7 96.5 50.7 -0.12
Managerial 2.09 14.3 21.9 25.1 96.2 65.5 0.27
C.E.O 2.85 13.8 27.0 0.59 98.2 48.9 0.30
Civil Servant
Lower 0 10.7 25.4 14.4 100 64.5 0.01
Middle 0.50 11.5 21.5 23.1 100 58.2 0.06
Upper 1.23 14.9 22.3 36.7 99.6 64.2 0.23
Executive 2.24 17.7 24.6 14.8 99.8 77.5 0.60
Genericc
Lower rank 0 10.1 25.5 58.9 82.7 56.9 -0.17
Middle rank 0.49 11.3 21.9 39.0 94.0 50.8 -0.05
Upper rank 1.67 13.9 22.7 25.1 96.6 67.1 0.23
Executive rank 2.46 16.1 25.3 14.4 99.1 66.2 0.48
a-Based on a sample of 11159 observations (3487 workers).
b-Mean wage diﬀerentials relative to the ﬁrst rank monthly average real
wage is (in thousands of marks) 1.37 for blue-collared, 1.41 for white-
collared, 1.93 for civil servants and 1.58 for level 1 of the aggregate positions.
c-For the blue-collars, rank 1 is composed of unskilled and semi-skilled work.
Appendix D: Testa of the Predictive Power of Instruments
Within Within & Between
CA CA + Learning CA CA + Learning
wt−1 6.31 12.99 5.24 10.50
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Rank Mt - 3.48 - 5.22
(0.0008) (0.0001)
Rank Ut - 3.29 - 13.17
(0.0005) (0.0001)
Rank EXt - 14.72 - 20.56
(0.0001) (0.0001)
a- F-test from regressions of the instrumented variables on the exogenous
variables and the instruments. p-value are in parenthesis.
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